INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ANTI-PERSONNEL
LAND MINES
Ambassador Michael J. Matheson*
The Convention on Conventional Weapons was adopted in 1980 to
limit the use of conventional weapons that present special risks of causing
unnecessary suffering or indiscriminate effects. The Convention currently
contains three Protocols, each of which regulates the use of a specific type
of weapons. Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons which rely on
non-detectable wounding fragments. Protocol II regulates the use of land
mines and booby-traps. Protocol III deals with the use of incendiary
weapons. The United States ratified the Convention, together with
Protocols I and II, earlier this year.
The Parties to the Convention are in the process of holding the
First Review Conference for the Convention, which just completed a
three-week session in Vienna. It succeeded in resolving one item on its
agenda-namely, the adoption of a new Protocol on Blinding Lasers. This
Protocol will prohibit the use and transfer of lasers "specifically designed
to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision." (The reference to
"unenhanced vision" excludes persons using optical devices, such as those
used to operate armored vehicles and to target tank and artillery fire.)
This was a welcome development.
This was, however, not the main purpose of the Review
Conference. The main objective was the revision of the current Protocol
on Land Mines, which is an essential task in light of the serious
humanitarian crisis created by the indiscriminate use of land mines in
many areas of the world during recent decades. The United States is
committed to taking vigorous action in various fora to deal with this crisis
in all its aspects. The eventual goal should be the elimination of
anti-personnel land mines, including a ban on their use, production,
stockpiling and transfer, recognizing that States can move most effectively
toward this goal as viable alternatives are developed that significantly
reduce the risk to the civilian population.
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The revision of the land mines Protocol is an important first step
toward this goal. If the restrictions of the Protocol had been observed
during the conflicts of the past two decades, there might have been a
substantial reduction in civilian casualties. Unfortunately, most of the
States involved in these conflicts were not parties to the Convention, and it
did not apply at all to internal armed conflicts, where most of these
casualties occurred. As a result, large numbers of mines were laid without
proper marking and recording, and often were used for the specific
purpose of causing civilian casualties.
However, the current Protocol is not a sufficient answer to the
problem of indiscriminate use of land mines. At the Review Conference,
the United States is pressing for a number of substantial improvements in
its provisions. These include, in particular, the following:
First, we favor an expansion in the scope of the
Protocol to apply in internal armed conflicts, as well as
during peacetime.
Second, we have proposed a requirement that all
remotely-delivered mines be equipped with self-destruct
devices to ensure that they do not remain a danger to
civilians long after the conflict is over. These mines
would also have backup self-deactivation features to ensure
that they do not detonate even if the self-destruct device
fails.
Third, we support a requirement that any
anti-personnel land mines without self-destruct devices and
backup self-deactivation features be used only within
controlled, marked and monitored minefields.
These
minefields would be protected by fencing or other
safeguards to ensure the exclusion of civilians. Such
minefields could not be abandoned, other than through
forcible loss of control to enemy military action, unless
they were cleared or turned over to another State that had
committed to maintain the same protections. Self-destruct
devices on anti-personnel mines would have a maximum
lifetime
of 30 days
from emplacement,
and
self-deactivation features would have a maximum lifetime
of 120 days.
Fourth, we favor a requirement that all mines be
detectable using commonly available technology. This
would greatly simplify the burdens and risks of demining.
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Fifth, we have proposed a requirement that the
party laying mines assume responsibility for them,
including a duty to clear them or maintain them in
controlled fields to protect civilians at the cessation of
active hostilities.
Sixth, we support the addition of an effective
compliance mechanism, including the possibility of
fact-finding inspections where credible reports of
violations have been made. If violations are found to have
occurred, there would be a possibility of reference to the
United Nations Security Council for action, as well as
individual criminal liability for persons who willfully or
wantonly put the civilian population in danger.
Finally, we have proposed the addition of a
mechanism for more frequent consideration of the land
mines Protocol and for exchange of views on all aspects of
the land mines issue.
The three-week session of the Review Conference that was just
concluded made considerable progress on most of these issues.
In
particular, the Conference seems near agreement on expanding the scope
of the Convention to internal conflicts, and on fundamental improvements
in the requirements for marking, monitoring, recording and clearing of
minefields, as well as the protection of international forces and missions
from land mine hazards. However, a handful of States were not able to
accept the requirements for detectability, self-destruct mechanisms and
self-deactivation features that the great majority of the Conference thought
essential to the humanitarian improvement of the Protocol. It was also not
possible to reach agreement on a meaningful compliance procedure to deal
with violations.
The Parties therefore decided to take a recess and to resume work
next year: for a week in January in Geneva to focus on the technical
issues that could not be resolved; and for two weeks in April and May in
Geneva to conclude the revision of the Protocol. In the meantime, we and
other like-minded governments are working hard to convince the
dissenting States to modify their positions so that the Conference can be
successfully concluded by next spring.
There should be no reason why these technical problems cannot be
resolved in a manner consistent with both humanitarian and military
requirements. On the detectability question, it is very important to have a
clear specification of the metallic signature required for land mines, so that
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they can be reliably detected and cleared. Otherwise, clearance teams will
continue to take heavy casualties and it will be dangerous or impossible for
civilians to return to their homes and fields. We have proposed a
minimum standard of the equivalent of 8 grams of metallic content, which
almost all States participating at the Review Conference were prepared to
accept. The problem is that two countries-India and China-have large
stockpiles of anti-personnel mines that fall well below this standard and
were therefore unwilling to accept the proposed requirement.
The United States is familiar with this problem because we have
over four million mines that also fail to meet the standard, but we are
prepared either to forego their use or to adapt them to bring them up to the
necessary metal content. In fact, it is relatively simple to make such mines
detectable-all that is required is the attachment of a simple device
containing the necessary metal mass, which can be done easily and cheaply
by applying a small piece of metallic tape or attaching a small metal disk
with tape, adhesive, or wire. We hope to convince China and India that
the minor inconvenience of taking these steps is well worth the
humanitarian benefit.
The issue of equipping mines with self-destruct and
self-deactivation features may be more difficult and complicated. Here,
Russia, China, and Pakistan have declined to accept the requirements that
were acceptable to the rest of the Conference participants, either because
they have stocks of non-compliant mines or because they may wish to
acquire mines that would not comply. Russia, in particular, appears to
have a large stock of anti-personnel mines-including the famous butterfly
mine used in large quantities in Afghanistan-that cannot be readily brought
into compliance because they will not destroy or deactivate themselves in a
reasonable period of time with reasonable reliability. We hope to convince
these governments to forego the use of these mines or, where possible, to
use them within marked and monitored minefields so that the effect on the
civilian population is minimized.
As I have noted, the goal of this Administration is the eventual
elimination of anti-personnel land mines. The fact is, however, that this
goal is not attainable today, both because the great majority of the major
military powers are absolutely unwilling to accept such a total prohibition,
and because our own military still requires such mines for certain military
missions where there are currently no effective substitutes. Nonetheless,
we can and we must act now to impose much stricter controls on landmine
use that can, if complied with, substantially reduce the risk to the civilian
population.

